SIX SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY EXPLAINED

VAISHESIKA

Vaisheshika, or Vaiśeṣika, (Sanskrit:वैशॆषिक) is one of the six Hindu schools of philosophy (orthodox Vedic systems) of India. Historically, it has been closely associated with the Hindu school of logic, Nyaya.

Vaisesika espouses a form of atomism and postulates that all objects in the physical universe are reducible to a finite number of atoms. Originally proposed by the sage Kaṇāda (or Kana-bhuk, literally, atom-eater) around the 2nd century BC. 

Overview

Although the Vaishesika system developed independently from the Nyaya, the two eventually merged because of their closely related metaphysical theories. In its classical form, however, the Vaishesika school differed from the Nyaya in one crucial respect: where Nyaya accepted four sources of valid knowledge, the Vaishesika accepted only perception and inference. Although not among Kanada's original philosophies, later Vaishesika atomism also differs from the atomic theory of modern science by claiming the functioning of atoms(or their characterization because of which they function in their way) was guided or directed by the will of the Supreme Being. This is therefore a theistic form of atomism. 

An alternative view would qualify the above in that the holism evident in the ancient texts mandate the identification of six separate traditional environments of philosophy, consisting of three sets of two pairs. 

Literature of Vaisheshika

The earliest systematic exposition of the Vaisheshika is found in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of Kaṇāda (or Kaṇabhaksha). This treatise is divided into ten books. The two commentaries on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, Rāvaṇabhāṣya and Bhāradvājavṛtti are no more extant. Praśastapāda’s Padārthadharmasaṁgraha (c. 4th century) is the next important work of this school. Though commonly known as bhāṣya of Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, this treatise is basically an independent work on the subject. The next Vaisheshika treatise, Candra’s Daśapadārthaśāstra (648) based on Praśastapāda’s treatise is available only in Chinese translation. The earliest available on Praśastapāda’s treatise is Vyomaśiva’s Vyomavatī (8th century). The other three commentaries are Śridhara’s Nyāyakandalī (991), Udayana’s Kiranāvali (10th century) and Śrivatsa’s Līlāvatī (11th century). Śivāditya’s Saptapadārthī which also belongs to the same period, presents the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika principles as a part of one whole. Śaṁkarā Miśra’s Upaskāra on Vaiśeṣika Sūtra is also an important work.

The categories or padartha

According to the Vaisheshika school, all things which exist, which can be cognised, and which can be named are padārthas (literal meaning: the meaning of a word), the objects of experience. All objects of experience can be classified into six categories, dravya (substance), guṇa (quality), karma (activity), sāmānya (generality), viśeṣa (particularity) and samavāya (inherence). Later Vaiśeṣikas (Śrīdhara and Udayana and Śivāditya) added one more category abhāva (non-existence). The first three categories are defined as artha (which can perceived) and they have real objective existence. The last three categories are defined as budhyapekṣam (product of intellectual discrimination) and they are logical categories.

1. Dravya (substance): The substances are conceived as 9 in number. They are, pṛthvī (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire), vāyu (air), ākaśa (sky), kāla (time), dik (space), ātman (self) and manas (mind). The first five are called bhūtas, the substances having some specific qualities so that they could be perceived by one or the other external senses.

2. Guṇa (quality): The Vaiśeṣika Sūtra mentions 17 guṇas (qualities), to which Praśastapāda added another 7. While a substance is capable of existing independently by itself, a guṇa(quality) cannot exist so. The original 17 guṇas (qualities) are, rūpa (colour), rasa (taste), gandha (smell), sparśa (touch), saṁkhyā (number), parimāṇa (size/dimension/quantity), pṛthaktva (inidividuality), saṁyoga (conjunction/accompaniments), vibhāga (disjunction), paratva (priority), aparatva (posteriority), buddhi (knowledge), sukha (pleasure), duḥkha (pain), icchā (desire), dveṣa (aversion) and prayatna (effort). To these Praśastapāda added gurutva (heaviness), dravatva (fluidity), sneha (viscosity), dharma (merit), adharma (demerit), śabda (sound) and saṁkāsra (faculty).

3. Karma (activity): The karmas (activities) like guṇas (qualities) have no separate existence, they belong to the substances. But while a quality is a permanent feature of a substance, an activity is a transient one. Ākaśa (sky), kāla (time), dik (space) and ātman (self), though substances, are devoid of karma (activity).

4. Sāmānya (generality): Since there are plurality of substances, there will be relations among them. When a property is found common to many substances, it is called sāmānya.

5. Viśeṣa (particularity): By means of viśeṣa , we are able to perceive substances as different from one another. As the ultimate atoms are innumerable so are the viśeṣas.

6. Samavāya (inherence): Kaṇāda defined samavāya as the relation between the cause and the effect. Praśastapāda defined it as the relationship existing between the substances that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained. The relation of samavāya is not perceivable but only inferable from the inseparable connection of the substances.

Epistemology and syllogism

The early vaiśeṣika epistemology considered only pratyaksha (perception) and anumāna (inference) as the pramaṇas (means of valid knowledge). The other two means of valid knowledge accepted by the Nyaya school, upamāna (comparison) and śabda (verbal testimony) were considered as included in anumāna. The syllogism of the vaiśeṣika school was similar to that of the Nyaya, but the names given by Praśastapāda to the 5 members of syllogism are different.

The atomic theory

The early vaiśeṣika texts presented the following syllogism to prove that all objects i.e. the four bhūtas, pṛthvī (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and vāyu (air) are made of indivisible paramāṇus (atoms): Assume that the matter is not made of indivisible atoms, and that it is continuous. Take a stone. One can divide this up into infinitely many pieces (since matter is continuous). Now, the Himalayan mountain range also has infinitely many pieces, so one may build another Himalayan mountain range with the infinite number of pieces that one has. One begins with a stone and ends up with the Himalayas, which is obviously ridiculous - so the original assumption that matter is continuous must be wrong, and so all objects must be made up of a finite number of paramāṇus (atoms).

According to the vaiśeṣika school, the trasareṇu (dust particles visible in the sunbeam coming through a small window hole) are the smallest mahat (perceivable) particles and defined as tryaṇukas (triads). These are made of three parts, each of which are defined as dvyaṇuka (dyad). The dvyaṇukas are conceived as made of two parts, each of which are defined as paramāṇu (atom). The paramāṇus (atoms) are indivisible and eternal, they can neither be created nor destroyed. Each paramāṇu (atom) possesses its own distinct viśeṣa (individuality).

Later developments

Over the centuries, the school merged with the Nyaya school of Indian philosophy to form the combined school of nyāya-vaiśeṣika. The school suffered a natural decline in India after the 15th century.

 

NYAYA

Nyāya (Sanskrit ni-āyá, literally "recursion", used in the sense of "syllogism, inference") is the name given to one of the six orthodox or astika schools of Hindu philosophy—specifically the school of logic. The Nyaya school of philosophical speculation is based on texts known as the Nyaya Sutras, which were written by Aksapada Gautama from around the 2nd century CE.

Overview

The most important contribution made by the Nyaya school to modern Hindu thought is its methodology. This methodology is based on a system of logic that, subsequently, has been adopted by the majority of the other Indian schools, orthodox or not. This is comparable to how Western science and philosophy can be said to be largely based on Aristotelian logic.

However, Nyaya differs from Aristotelian logic in that it is more than logic in its own right. Its followers believed that obtaining valid knowledge was the only way to obtain release from suffering. They therefore took great pains to identify valid sources of knowledge and to distinguish these from mere false opinions. Nyaya is thus a form of epistemology in addition to logic.

According to the Nyaya school, there are exactly four sources of knowledge (pramanas): perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. Knowledge obtained through each of these can, of course, still be either valid or invalid. As a result, Nyaya scholars again went to great pains to identify, in each case, what it took to make knowledge valid, in the process creating a number of explanatory schemes. In this sense, Nyaya is probably the closest Indian equivalent to contemporary analytic philosophy.

Sixteen padarthas or categories

The Nyaya metaphysics recognizes sixteen padarthas or categories and includes all six (or seven) categories of the Vaisheshika in the second one of them, called prameya. These sixteen categories are pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge), prameya (objects of valid knowledge), saṁśaya (doubt), prayojana (aim), dṛṣṭānta (example), siddhānta (conclusion), avayava (members of syllogism), tarka (hypothetical reasoning), nirṇaya (settlement), vāda (discussion), jalpa (wrangling), vitaṇḍā (cavilling), hetvābhāsa (fallacy), chala (quibbling), jāti (sophisticated refutation) and nigrahasthāna (point of defeat).

Epistemology

The Nyaya epistemology considers knowledge (jñāna) or cognition (buddhi) as apprehension (upalabdhi) or consciousness (anubhava). Knowledge may be valid or invalid. The Naiyayikas (the Nyaya scholars) accepted four valid means (pramaṇa) of obtaining valid knowledge (prama) - perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda). Invalid knowledge includes memory (smṛti), doubt (saṁśaya), error (viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning (tarka).

Perception

Pratyakṣa (perception) occupies the foremost position in the Nyaya epistemology. Perception is defined by Akṣapāda Gautama in his Nyaya Sutra (I,i.4) as a 'non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of sense-organs with the objects, which is not associated with a name and well-defined'. Perception can be of two types, laukika (ordinary) and alaukika (extraordinary).

Ordinary perception

Ordinary (Laukika or Sadharana) perception is of six types - visual-by eyes, olfactory-by nose, auditory-by ears, tactile-by skin, gustatory-by tongue and mental-by mind.

Extra-ordinary perception

Extraordinary (Alaukika or Asadharana) perception is of three types, viz., Samanyalakshana (perceiving generality from a particular object), Jñanalakshana (when one sense organ can also perceive qualities not attributable to it, as when seeing a chili, one knows that it would be bitter or hot), and Yogaja (when certain human beings, from the power of Yoga, can perceive past, present and future and have supernatural abilities, either complete or some).

Determinate and indeterminate perception

The Naiyayika maintains two modes or stages in perception. The first is called nirvikalpa (indeterminate), when one just perceives an object without being able to know its features, and the second savikalpa (determinate), when one is able to clearly know an object. All laukika and alaukika pratyakshas are savikalpa, but it is necessarily preceded by an earlier stage when it is indeterminate. Vātsāyana says that if an object is perceived with its name we have determinate perception but if it is perceived without a name, we have indeterminate perception. Jayanta Bhatta says that indeterminate perception apprehends substance, qualities and actions and universals as separate and indistinct something and also it does not have any association with name, while determinate perception aprrehends all these together with a name. There is yet another stage called Pratyabhijñā, when one is able to re-recognise something on the basis of memory.

Inference
Anumāna (inference) is one of the most important contributions of the Nyaya. It can be of two types: inference for oneself (Svarthanumana, where one does not need any formal procedure, and at the most the last three of their 5 steps), and inference for others (Parathanumana, which requires a systematic methodology of 5 steps). Inference can also be classified into 3 types: Purvavat (inferring an unperceived effect from a perceived cause), Sheshavat (inferring an unperceived cause from a perceived effect) and Samanyatodrishta (when inference is not based on causation but on uniformity of co-existence). A detailed anaysis of error is also given, explaining when anumana could be false.

Comparison

Upamāna, which can be roughly translated as comparison is the knowledge of the relationship between a word and the object denoted by the word. It is produced by the knowledge of resemblance or similarity, given some pre-description of the new object beforehand.

Verbal testimony

Śabda or verbal testimony is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person (āptavākya), and consists in understanding its meaning. It can be of two types, Vaidika (Vedic), which are the words of the four sacred Vedas, and are described as the Word of God, having been composed by God, and Laukika, or words and writings of trustworthy human beings. while Vaidika testimony is perfect because the Vedas are spoken by God, Laukika testimony are is not infallible.

Theory of inference

The methodology of inference involves a combination of induction and deduction by moving from particular to particular via generality. It has five steps, as in the example shown:

* There is fire on the hill (called Pratijñā, required to be proved)

* Because there is smoke there (called Hetu, reason)

* Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, e.g. in a kitchen (called Udāhārana, example of vyāpti)

* The hill has smoke that is pervaded by fire (called Upanaya, reaffirmation or application)

* Therefore there is fire on the hill (called Nigamana, conclusion)

In Nyāya terminology for this example, the hill would be called as paksha (minor term), the fire is called as sādhya (major term), the smoke is called as hetu, and the relationship between the smoke and the fire is called as vyāpti(middle term). Hetu further has five characteristics: 

(1) It must be present in the Paksha, 

(2) It must be present in all positive instances, 

(3) It must be absent in all negative instances, 

(4) It must not incompatible with the minor term or Paksha   and 

(5) All other contradictions by other means of knowledge should be absent.

The fallacies in Anumana (hetvābhasa) may occur due to the following:

1. Asiddha: It is the unproved hetu that results in this fallacy. [Paksadharmata]

* Ashrayasiddha: If Paksha [minor term] itself is unreal, then there cannot be locus of the hetu. e.g. The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus like any other lotus.

* Svarupasiddha: Hetu cannot exist in paksa at all. E.g. Sound is a quality, because it is visible.

* Vyapyatvasiddha: Conditional hetu. `Wherever there is fire, there is smoke'. The presence of smoke is due to wet fuel.

2. Savyabhichara: This is the fallacy of irregular hetu.

* Sadharana: The hetu is too wide. It is present in both sapaksa and vipaksa. `The hill has fire because it is knowable'.

* Asadharana: The hetu is too narrow. It is only present in the Paksha, it is not present in the Sapaksa and in the Vipaksha. `Sound is eternal because it is audible'.

* Anupasamhari: Here the hetu is non-exclusive. The hetu is all-inclusive and leaves nothing by way of sapaksha or vipaksha. e.g. 'All things are non-ternal, because they are knowable'.

3. Satpratipaksa: Here the hetu is contradicted by another hetu. If both have equal force, then nothing follows. 'Sound is eternal, because it is audible', and 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced'. Here 'audible' is counter-balanced by 'produced' and both are of equal force.

4. Badhita: When another proof (as by perception) definitely contradicts and disproves the middle term (hetu). 'Fire is cold because it is a substance'.

5. Viruddha: Instead of proving something it is proving the opposite. 'Sound is eternal because it is produced'.

The Nyaya theory of causation

A cause is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect and an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. The same cause produces the same effect; and the same effect is produced by the same cause. The cause is not present in any hidden form whatsoever in its effect.

The following conditions should be met:

1. The cause must be antencedent [Purvavrtti]

2. Invariability [Niyatapurvavrtti]

3. Unconditionality [Ananyathasiddha]

Nyaya recognizes five kinds of accidental antecedents [Anyathasiddha]

1. Mere accidental antecedent. E.g., The colour of the potter's cloth.

2. Remote cause is not a cause because it is not unconditional. E.g., The father of the potter.

3. The co-effects of a cause are not causally related.

4. Eternal substances, or eternal conditions are not unconditional antecedents. e.g. space.

5. Unnecessary things, e.g. the donkey of the potter.

Nyaya recognizes three kinds of cause:

1. Samavayi, material cause. E.g. Thread of a cloth.

2. Asamavayi, colour of the thread which gives the colour of the cloth.

3. Nimitta', efficient cause, e.g. the weaver of the cloth.

Anyathakyativada of Nyaya

The Nyaya theory of error is similar to that of Kumarila's Viparita-khyati (see Mimamsa). The Naiyayikas also believe like Kumarila that error is due to a wrong synthesis of the presented and the represented objects. The represented object is confused with the presented one. The word 'anyatha' means 'elsewise' and 'elsewhere' and both these meanings are brought out in error. The presented object is perceived elsewise and the represented object exists elsewhere. They further maintain that knowledge is not intrinsically valid but becomes so on account of extraneous conditions (paratah pramana during both validity and invalidity).

Nyaya argument for the existence of God

Early Naiyayikas wrote very little about God, i.e., Ishvara (literally, the Supreme Lord). However, later Buddhists in India had become from agnostic to strictly atheistic. As a reaction, the later Naiyayikas entered into disputes with the Buddhists and tried to prove the existence of God through logic. They made this question a challenge to their own existence. They gave the following nine proofs for the existence of God, enlisted in Udayana's Nyaya Kusumanjali:

* Kāryāt (lit. "from effect"): An effect is produced by a cause, and similarly, the universe must also have a cause. Causes (according to Naiyayikas) are of three kinds: Samavayi (in case of the universe, the atoms), Asamavayi (the association of atoms) and Nimitta (which is Ishvara). The active cause of the world must have an absolute knowledge of all the material of creation, and hence it must be God. Hence from the creation, the existence of the Creator is proved.

* Āyojanāt  (lit., from combination): Atoms are inactive and properties are unphysical. So it must be God who creates the world with his will by causing the atoms to join. Self-combination of inanimate and lifeless things is not possible, otherwise atoms would only combine at random, creating chaos. There is to be seen the hand of a wise organizer behind the systematic grouping of the ultimate atoms into dyads and molecules. That final organizer is God.

* Dhŗité (lit., from support): Just as a material thing falls off without a support, similarly, God is the supporter and bearer of this world, without which the world would not have remained integrated. This universe is hence superintended within God, which proves his existence.

* Padāt (lit., from word): Every word has the capability to represent a certain object. It is the will of God that a thing should be represented by a certain word. Similarly, no knowledge can come to us of the different things here unless there is a source of this knowledge. The origin of all knowledge should be omniscient and, consequently, omnipotent. Such a being is not to be seen in this universe, and so it must be outside it. This being is God.

* Pratyatah (lit, from faith): the Hindu holy scriptures, the Vedas, are regarded as the source of eternal knowledge. Their knowledge is free from fallacies and are widely believed as a source of proof. Their authors cannot be human beings because human knowledge is limited. They cannot obtain knowledge of past, present, and future, and in depth knowledge of mind. Hence, only God can be the creator of the Vedas. Hence, his existence is proved from his being the author of the Vedas, which he revealed to various sages over a period of time.

* Shrutéh (lit., from scriptures): The Shrutis, e.g., the Vedas extol God and talk about his existence. "He is the lord of all subjects, omniscient, and knower of one's internal feelings; He is the creator, cause and destroyer of the world", say the Shrutis. The Shrutis are regarded as a source of proofs by Naiyanikas. Hence, the existence of God is proved.

* Vākyāt (lit., from precepts): Again, the Veda must have been produced by a person because it has the nature of "sentences," i.e., the sentences of the Veda were produced by a person because they have the nature of sentences, just as the sentences of beings like ourselves. That person must have been God.

* Samkhyāvişheshāt (lit., from the specialty of numbers): The size of a dyad or a molecule depends on the number of the atoms that constitute it. This requisite number of the atoms that form a particular compound could not have been originally the object of the perception of any human being; so its contemplator must be God.

* Adŗişhţāt (lit., from the unforeseen): It is seen that some people in this world are happy, some are in misery. Some are rich, and some are poor. The Naiyanikas explain this by the concept of Karma and reincarnation. The fruit of an individual's actions does not always lie within the reach of the individual who is the agent. There ought to be, therefore, a dispenser of the fruits of actions, and this supreme dispenser is God.

Nyaya arguments for monotheism

Not only have the Naiyanikas given proofs for the existence of God, but they have also given an argument that such a God can only be one. In the Nyaya Kusumanjali, this is discussed against the proposition of the Mimamsa school—that let us assume there were many demigods (Devas) and sages (rishis) in the beginning, who wrote the Vedas and created the world. Nyaya says that:

[if they assume such] omniscient beings, those endowed with the various superhuman faculties of assuming infinitesimal size, and so on, and capable of creating everything, then we reply that the law of parsimony bids us assume only one such, namely Him, the adorable Lord. There can be no confidence in a non-eternal and non omniscient being, and hence it follows that according to the system which rejects God, the tradition of the Veda is simultaneously overthrown; there is no other way open.

In other words, Nyaya says that the polytheist would have to give elaborate proofs for the existence and origin of his several celestial spirits, none of which would be logical. So it is much more logical to assume only One, eternal and omniscient God.

Literature of Nyaya

The earliest text of the Nyaya School is the Nyāya Sūtra of Akṣapāda Gautama. The text is divided into five books, each having two sections. Vātsāyana’s Nyāya Bhāṣya is a classic commentary on the Nyāya Sūtra. Udyotakara’s Nyāya Vārttika (6th century CE) is written to defend Vātsāyana against the attacks made by Dignāga. Vācaspati Miśra’s Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (9th century CE) is the next major exposition of this school. Two other texts, Nyāyaṣūcinibandha and Nyāyasūtraddhāra are also attributed to him. Udayana’s (984 CE) Nyāyatātparyapariśuddhi is an important commentary on Vācaspati’s treatise. His Nyāyakusumāñjali is the first systematic account of theistic Nyāya. His other works include Ātmatattvaviveka, Kiraṇāvali and Nyāyapariśiṣṭa. Jayanta Bhatta’s Nyāyamañjari (10th century CE) is basically an independent work. Bhāsavarajña’s Nyāyasāra (10th century CE) is a survey of Nyāya philosophy).

The later works on Nyāya accepted the Vaiśeṣika categories and Varadarāja’s Tārkikarakṣā (12th century CE) is a notable treatise of this syncretist school. Keśava Miśra’s Tārkabhaṣā (13th century CE) is another important work of this school.

Gangeśa Upādhyāya’s Tattvacintāmaṇi (12th century CE) is the first major treatise of the new school of Navya Nyāya. His son, Vardhamāna Upādhyāya’s Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa (1225 CE), though a commentary on Udayana’s Nyāyatātparyapariśuddhi, incorporated his father’s views. Jayadeva wrote a commentary on Tattvacintāmaṇi known as Āloka (13th century CE). Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma’s Tattvacintāmaṇivyākhyā (16th century CE) is first great work of Navadvipa school of Navya Nyāya. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi’s Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti and Padārthakhaṇḍana are the next important works of this school. Viśvanatha’s Nyāyasūtravṛtti (17th century CE) is also a notable work[7]. The Commentaries on Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti by Jagadish Tarkalankar (17th century CE) and Gadadhar Bhattacharya (17th century CE) are the last two notable works of this school.

Ānnaṁbhatta (17th century CE) tried to develop a consistent system by combining the ancient and the new schools, Prācina nyāya and Navya nyāya and Vaiśeṣika to develop the nyāya-vaiśeṣika school. His Tarkasaṁgraha and Dīpikā are the popular manuals of this school.

MIMAMSA

Mīmāmsā (मीमांसा), a Sanskrit word meaning "investigation", is the name of an astika ("orthodox") school of Hindu philosophy whose primary enquiry is into the nature of dharma based on close hermeneutics of the Vedas. Its core tenets are ritualism (orthopraxy), anti-asceticism and anti-mysticism. The central aim of the school is elucidation of the nature of dharma, understood as a set ritual obligations and prerogatives to be performed properly. The nature of dharma isn't accessible to reason or observation, and must be inferred from the authority of the revelation contained in the Vedas, which are considered eternal, authorless (apaurusheyatva), and infallible.

Mimamsa strongly concerned with textual exegesis, and consequently gave rise to the study of philology and the philosophy of language. Its notion of shabda "speech" as indivisible unity of sound and meaning (signifier and signified) is due to Bhartrhari (7th century).

Terminology

Mimamsa is also known as Pūrva Mīmāṃsā ("prior" inquiry, also Karma-Mīmāṃsā), in contrast to Uttara Mīmāṃsā ("posterior" inquiry, also Brahma-Mīmāṃsā) is the opposing school of Vedanta. This division is based on the notion of a dichotomy of the Vedic texts into a karma-kāṇḍa, the department of the Veda treating of sacrificial rites (Samhitas and Brahmanas), and the jñāna-kāṇḍa dealing with the knowledge of Brahman (the Upanishads).

History

The school's origins lie in the scholarly traditions of the final centuries BCE, when the priestly ritualism of Vedic sacrifice was being marginalized by Buddhism and Vedanta. To counteract this challenge, several groups emerged dedicated to demonstrating the validity of the Vedic texts by rigid formulation of rules for their interpretation. The school gathers momentum in the Gupta period with Śābara, and reaches its apex in the 7th to 8th centuries with Kumārila Bha..a and Prabhākara.

The school for some time in the Early Middle Ages exerted near-dominant influence on learned Hindu thought, and is credited as a major force contributing to the decline of Buddhism in India, but it has fallen into decline in the High Middle Ages and today is all but eclipsed by Vedanta.

Mimamsa texts

The foundational text for the Mimamsa school is the Purva Mimamsa Sutras of Jaimini (ca. 3rd to 1st century BCE). A major commentary was composed by Śābara in ca. the 5th or 6th century CE. The school reaches its height with Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara (fl. ca. 700 CE). Both Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhākara (along with Murāri, whose work is no more extant) have written extensive commentaries on Śābara's Mimamsasutrabhāshyam. Kumārila Bhatta, Mandana Misra, Parthasarathi Misra, Sucharita Misra, Ramakrishna Bhatta, Madhava Subhodini, Sankara Bhatta, Krsnayajvan, Anantadeva, Gaga Bhatta, Ragavendra Tirtha, VijayIndhra Tirtha, Appayya Dikshitar, Paruthiyur Krishna Sastri, Mahomahapadyaya Sri Ramsubba Sastri, Sri Venkatsubba Sastri, Sri A. Chinnaswami Sastri, Sengalipuram Vaidhyanatha Dikshitar were some of the Mimamsa Scholars.

The Mīmāṁsā Sūtra of Jaimini (c. 3rd century BCE) has summed up the general rules of nyāya for Vedic interpretation. The text has 12 chapters, of which the first chapter is of philosophical value. The commentaries on the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra by Bhartṛmitra, Bhavadāsa, Hari and Upavarṣa are no more extant. Śabara (c. 1st century BCE) is the first commentator of the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra, whose work is available to us. His bhāṣya is the basis of all later works of Mīmāṁsā . Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (7th century CE), the founder of the first school of the Mīmāṁsā commented on both the Sūtra and its Śabara Bhāṣya. His treatise consists of 3 parts, the Ślokavārttika, the Tantravārttika and the Ṭupṭīkā. Manḍana Miśra (8th century CE) was a follower of Kumārila, who wrote Vidhiviveka and Mīmāṁsānukramaṇī. There are several commentaries on the works of Kumārila. Sucarita Miśra wrote a Kāśikā (commentary) on the Ślokavārttika. Someśvara Bhatta wrote Nyāyasudhā, also known as Rāṇaka, a commentary on the Tantravārttika. Pārthasarathi Miśra wrote Nyāyaratnākara (1300 CE), another commentary on the Ślokavārttika. He also wrote Śāstradīpikā, an independent work on the Mīmāṁsā and Tantraratna. Venkaṭa Dīkṣita’s Vārttikabharaṇya is a commentary on the Ṭupṭīkā. Prabhākara (8th century CE), the originator of the second school of the Mīmāṁsā wrote his commentary Bṛhatī on the Śabara Bhāṣya. Śālikanātha’s Ṛjuvimalā (9th century CE) is a commentary on the Bṛhatī. His Prakaraṇapañcikā is an independent work of this school and the Pariśiṣṭa is a brief explanation of the Śabara Bhāṣya. Bhavanātha’s Nyāyaviveka deals with the views of this school in details. The founder of the third school of the Mīmāṁsā was Murāri, whose works have not reached us.

Āpadeva (17th century) wrote an elementary work on the Mīmāṁsā, known as Mīmāṁsānyāyaprakaśa or Āpadevī. Arthasaṁgraha of Laugākṣi Bhāskara is based on the Āpadevī. Vedānta Deśika’s Śeśvara Mīmāṁsā was an attempt to combine the views of the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta schools.

Epistemology

In the field of epistemology, later Mimamsakas made some notable contributions. Unlike the Nyaya or the Vaisheshika systems, the Prābhākara school recognizes five pramanas (means of valid knowledge) and the Bhāṭṭa school recognizes six. In addition to the four pramanas (pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna and śabda) accepted by the Nyaya school, the Prābhākara school recognizes arthāpatti (presumption) and the Bhāṭṭa school recognizes both arthāpatti and anuapalabdhi (non-apprehension) as the valid means of knowledge. A more interesting feature of the Mimamsa school of philosophy is its unique epistemological theory of the intrinsic validity of all cognition as such. It is held that all knowledge is ipso facto true (Satahprāmāṇyavāda). Thus, what is to be proven is not the truth of a cognition, but its falsity. The Mimamsakas advocate the self-validity of knowledge both in respect of its origin (utpatti) and ascertainment (jñapti). Not only did the Mimamsakas make the very great use of this theory to establish the unchallengeable validity of the Vedas, but later Vedantists also drew freely upon this particular Mimamsa contribution.

Dharma and atheism

Dharma as understood by Poorva Mimāmsā can be loosely translated into English as "virtue", "morality" or "duty". The Poorva Mimāmsā school traces the source of the knowledge of dharma neither to sense-experience nor inference, but to verbal cognition (i.e. knowledge of words and meanings) according to Vedas. In this respect it is related to the Nyaya school, the latter, however, allows less Prāmānas (proofs) than Poorva Mimāmsā.

The Poorva Mimāmsā school held dharma to be equivalent to following the prescriptions of the Samhitas and their Brahmana commentaries relating the correct performance of Vedic rituals. Seen in this light, Poorva Mimamsa is essentially ritualist (orthopraxy), placing great weight on the performance of Karma or action as enjoined by the Vedas.

Emphasis of Yajnic Karmakāndas in Poorva Mimāmsā is erroneously interpreted by some to be an opposition to Jnānakānda of Vedānta and Upanishadas. Poorva Mimāmsā does not discuss topics related to Jnānakānda, such as moksha or salvation, but it never speaks against moksha. Vedānta quotes Jaimini's belief in Brahman as well as in moksha:

In Uttara-Mīmāmsā or Vedānta (4.4.5-7), Bādarāyana cites Jaimini as saying (ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरूपन्यासादिभ्यः) "(The mukta Purusha is united with the Brahman) as if it were like the Brahman, because descriptions (in Shruti etc) prove so".

In Vedānta (1.2.28), Bādarāyana cites Jaimini as saying that "There is no contradictiction in taking Vaishvānara as the supreme Brahman".

In 1.2.31, Jaimini is again quoted by Bādarāyana as saying that the nirguna Brahman can manifest itself as having a form.

In 4.3.12, Bādarāyana again cites Jaimini as saying that the mukta Purusha attains Brahman.

In Poorva Mimāmsā too, Jaimini emphasises the importance of faith in and attachment to the Omnipotent Supreme Being Whom Jaimini calls "The Omnipotent Pradhaana" (The Main):

Poorva Mimāmsā 6.3.1: "sarvaśaktau pravṛttiḥ syāt tathābhūtopadeśāt" (सर्वशक्तौ प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् तथाभूतोपदेशात्). The term Upadesha here is means instructions of the Shāstras as taught. We should tend towards the Omnipotent Supreme Being. In the context of Poorva Mimāmsā 6.3.1 shown above, next two sutras becomes significant, in which this Omnipotent Being is termed as "Pradhāna", and keeping away from Him is said to be a "Dosha", hence all beings are asked to get related ("abhisambandhāt" in tadakarmaṇi ca doṣas tasmāt tato viśeṣaḥ syāt pradhānenābhisambandhāt; Jaimini 6, 3.3) to the "Omnipotent Main Being" (api vāpy ekadeśe syāt pradhāne hy arthanirvṛttir guṇamātram itarat tadarthatvāt; Jaimini 6, 3.2). Karma-Mīmāmsā supports the Vedas, and Rgveda says that one Truth is variously named by the sages. It is irrelevant whether we call Him as Pradhāna or Brahman or Vaishvānara or Shiva or God. With such explicit ideas in Poorva-Mīmāmsā, and supportive evidences from Uttara-Mīmāmsā, it is wrong to say that the concept of Supreme God is absent in Poorva-Mīmāmsā. Poorva-Mīmāmsā believes in Vedas and in Yajnas performed for gods (Devatās), hence it is wrong to call it atheist, especially in light of explicit affirmation of its faith in the Omnipotent (Poorva Mimāmsā 6.3.1)

     

 SANKHYA

Sankhya, also Sankhya, Sāṃkhya, or Sāṅkhya (Sanskrit: सांख्य, IAST: sāṃkhya - 'enumeration') is one of the six schools of classical Indian philosophy. Sage Kapila is traditionally considered as the founder of the Sankhya school, although no historical verification is possible. It is regarded as one of the oldest philosophical systems in India.

Sankhya was one of the six orthodox systems (astika, those systems that recognize vedic authority) of Hindu philosophy. The major text of this Vedic school is the extant Sankhya Karika, circa 200 CE. This text (in karika 70) identifies Sankhya as a Tantra and its philosophy was one of the main influences both on the rise of the Tantras as a body of literature, as well as Tantra sadhana[3]. There are no purely Sankhya schools existing today in Hinduism, but its influence is felt in the Yoga and Vedanta schools. 

Sankhya is an enumerationist philosophy that is strongly dualist. Sankhya philosophy regards the universe as consisting of two realities: Purusha (consciousness) and Prakriti (phenomenal realm of matter). They are the experiencer and the experienced, not unlike the res cogitans and res extensa of René Descartes. Prakriti further bifurcates into animate and inanimate realms. On the other hand, Purusha separates out into countless Jivas or individual units of consciousness as souls which fuse into the mind and body of the animate branch of Prakriti. 

There are differences between Sankhya and Western forms of dualism. In the West, the fundamental distinction is between mind and body. In Sankhya, however, it is between the self (as Purusha) and matter (Prakriti). 

Literature

Sage Kapila is considered as the founder of the Sankhya school, but there is no evidence to prove that the texts attributed to him, the Sāṁkhyapravacana Sūtra and the Tattvasamāsa were actually composed by him. According to a modern scholar Surendranath Dasgupta, the doctrine of the earliest school of Sankhya is found in an ancient Indian medical treatise, Charaka Samhita . Another early extant text of this school is Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa (3rd century). Iśvarakṛṣṇa in his Kārikā described himself as being in the succession of the disciples from Kapila, through Āsuri and Pañcaśikha. Gauḍapāda wrote a commentary on this Kārikā. The next important work is Vācaspati’s Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī (9th century AD). Nārāyaṇa’s treatise Sāṁkhyacandrikā is based on the Kārikā. The Sāṁkhyapravacana Sūtra is assigned to the 14th century, as Guṇaratna (14th century) did not refer to this text but referred to the Kārikā. This text consists of 6 chapters and 526 sūtras. The most important commentary on the Sāṁkhyapravacana Sūtra is Vijñānabhikṣu’s Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya (16th century).

Anirruddha’s Kāpilasāṁkhyapravacanasūtravṛtti (15th century) and Mahādeva’s  Sāṁkhyapravacanasūtravṛttisāra (c. 1600) and Nāgeśa’s Laghusāṁkhyasūtravṛtti are the other important commentaries on this text.

Epistemology

According to the Sankhya school, all knowledge is possible through three pramanas (means of valid knowledge) -

1. Pratyaksha or Drishtam - direct sense perception,

2. Anumana - logical inference and

3.  Sabda or Aptavacana - verbal testimony. 

Sankhya cites two kinds of perceptions:

Indeterminate (nirvikalpa) perceptions and determinate (savikalpa) perceptions.

Indeterminate perceptions are merely impressions without understanding or knowledge. They reveal no knowledge of the form or the name of the object. There is only external awareness about an object. There is cognition of the object, but no discriminative recognition.

For example, a baby’s initial experience is full of impression. There is a lot of data from sensory perception, but there is little or no understanding of the inputs. Hence they can be neither differentiated nor labeled. Most of them are indeterminate perceptions. 

Determinate perceptions are the mature state of perceptions which have been processed and differentiated appropriately. Once the sensations have been processed, categorized, and interpreted properly, they become determinate perceptions. They can lead to identification and also generate knowledge.

Metaphysics

Ontology
Broadly, the Sankhya system classifies all objects as falling into one of the two categories: Purusha and Prakriti. Metaphysically, Sankhya maintains an intermingled duality between spirit/consciousness (Purusha) and matter (Prakrti).
Purusha

Purusha is the Transcendental Self or Pure Consciousness. It is absolute, independent, free, imperceptible, unknowable, above any experience and beyond any words or explanation. It remains pure, “nonattributive consciousness ”. Purusha is neither produced nor does it produce. Unlike Advaita Vedanta and like Purva-Mimamsa, Sankhya believes in plurality of the Purushas.

Prakriti

Prakriti is the first cause of the universe—of everything except the Purusha, which is uncaused, and accounts for whatever is physical, both matter and force. Since it is the first principle (tattva) of the universe, it is called the Pradhana, but, as it is the unconscious and unintelligent principle, it is also called the Jada. It is composed of three essential characteristics (trigunas). These are:

* sattva - fineness, lightness, illumination, and joy; 

* rajas - activity, excitation, and pain; 

* tamas - coarseness, heavyness, obstruction, and sloth. 

All physical events are considered to be manifestations of the evolution of Prakriti, or primal nature (from which all physical bodies are derived). Each sentient being is a Purusha, and is limitless and unrestricted by its physical body. Samsaara or bondage arises when the Purusha does not have the discriminate knowledge and so is misled as to its own identity, confusing itself with the physical body, which is actually an evolute of Prakriti. The spirit is liberated when the discriminate knowledge of the difference between conscious Purusha and unconscious Prakriti is realized.

Ishvara (Creationist God)

The Sānkhyapravacana Sūtra states that there is no philosophical place for a creationist God in this system. It is also argued in this text that the existence of Ishvara cannot be proved and hence cannot be admitted to exist and an unchanging Ishvara as the cause cannot be the source of a changing world as the effect. Almost all modern scholars are of view that the concept of Ishvara was incorporated into the nirishvara (atheistic) Sankhya viewpoint only after it became associated with the Yoga, the Pasupata and the Bhagavata schools of philosophy. This theistic Sankhya philosophy is described in the Mahabharata, the Puranas and the Bhagavad Gita.

Nature of Duality

The Sankhya recognizes only two ultimate entities, Prakriti and Purusha. While the Prakriti is a single entity, the Sankhya admits a plurality of the Purushas. Unintelligent, unmanifest, uncaused, ever-active, imperceptible and eternal Prakriti is alone the final source of the world of objects which is implicitly and potentially contained in its bosom. The Purusha is considered as the intelligent principle, a passive enjoyer (bhokta) and the Prakriti is the enjoyed (bhogya). Sankhya believes that the Purusha cannot be regarded as the source of inanimate world, because an intelligent principle cannot transform itself into the unintelligent world. It is a pluralistic spiritualism, atheistic realism and uncompromising dualism.

Consciousness/Matter-dualism.

Theory of Existence

The Sankhya system is based on Satkaryavada. According to Satkaryavada, the effect pre-exists in the cause. Cause and effect are seen as different temporal aspects of the same thing - the effect lies latent in the cause which in turn seeds the next effect.
More specifically, Sankhya system follows the Prakriti-Parinama Vada. Parinama denotes that the effect is a real transformation of the cause. The cause under consideration here is Prakriti or more precisely Mula-Prakriti (Primordial Matter). The Sankhya system is therefore an exponent of an evolutionary theory of matter beginning with primordial matter. In evolution, Prakriti is transformed and differentiated into multiplicity of objects. Evolution is followed by dissolution. In dissolution the physical existence, all the worldly objects mingle back into Prakriti, which now remains as the undifferentiated, primordial substance. This is how the cycles of evolution and dissolution follow each other.

The twenty-four principles 

Sankhya theorizes that Prakriti is the source of the world of becoming. It is pure potentiality that evolves itself successively into twenty four tattvas or principles. The evolution itself is possible because Prakriti is always in a state of tension among its constituent strands - 

* Sattva - a template of balance or equilibrium; 

* Rajas - a template of expansion or activity; 

* Tamas - a template of inertia or resistance to action. 

All macrocosmic and microcosmic creation uses these templates. The twenty four principles that evolve are - 

* Prakriti - The most subtle potentiality that is behind whatever is created in the physical universe, also called "primordial Matter". It is also a state of equilibrium amongst the Three Gunas. 

* Mahat - first product of evolution from Prakriti, pure potentiality. Mahat is also considered to be the principle responsible for the rise of buddhi or intelligence in living beings.
* Ahamkara or ego-sense - second product of evolution. It is responsible for the self-sense in living beings. It is also one's identification with the outer world and its content.
* "Panch Tanmatras" are a simultaneous product from Mahat Tattva, along with the Ahamkara. They are the subtle form of Panch Mahabhutas which result from grossification or Panchikaran of the Tanmatras. Each of these Tanmatras are made of all three Gunas. 

* Manas or "Antahkaran" evolves from the total sum of the sattva aspect of Panch Tanmatras or the "Ahamkara" 

* Panch jnana indriyas or five sense organs - also evolves from the sattva aspect of Ahamkara.
* Pancha karma indriya or five organs of action - The organs of action are hands, legs, vocal apparatus, urino-genital organ and anus. They evolve from the rajas aspect of Ahamkara.
* Pancha mahabhuta or five great substances - ether, air, fire, water and earth. They evolve from the "tamas" aspect of the "Ahamkara". This is the revealed aspect of the physical universe. 

The evolution of primal nature is also considered to be purposeful - Prakrti evolves for the spirit in bondage. The spirit who is always free is only a witness to the evolution, even though due to the absence of discriminate knowledge, he misidentifies himself with Purusha (body). 

The evolution obeys causality relationships, with primal Nature itself being the material cause of all physical creation. The cause and effect theory of Sankhya is called Satkaarya-vaada (theory of existent causes), and holds that nothing can really be created from or destroyed into nothingness - all evolution is simply the transformation of primal Nature from one form to another. 

The evolution of matter occurs when the relative strengths of the attributes change. The evolution ceases when the spirit realizes that it is distinct from primal Nature and thus cannot evolve. This destroys the purpose of evolution, thus stopping Prakrti from evolving for Purusha. 

Sankhyan cosmology describes how life emerges in the universe; the relationship between Purusha and Prakriti is crucial to Patanjali's yoga system. The evolution of forms at the basis of Sankhya is quite remarkable. The strands of Sankhyan thought can be traced back to the Vedic speculation of creation. It is also frequently mentioned in the Mahabharata and Yogavasishta.

Moksha

Like other major systems of Indian philosophy, Sankhya regards ignorance as the root cause of bondage and suffering (Samsara). According to Sankhya, the Purusha is eternal, pure consciousness. Due to ignorance, it identifies itself with the physical body and its constituents - Manas, Ahamkara and Mahat, which are products of Prakriti. Once it becomes free of this false identification and the material bonds, Moksha ensues. Other forms of Sankhya teach that Moksha is attained by one's own development of the higher faculties of discrimination achieved by meditation and other yogic practices as prescribed through the Hindu Vedas.

Views of what happens to the soul after liberation vary tremendously, as the Sankhya view is used by many different Hindu sects and is rarely practiced alone.

VEDANTA

 As per the teachings contained in the 108+ upanishads

What is ‘life’? What is its main aim? Who am ‘I’? What is the entity that is to be understood by the concept that is denoted by the word ‘I’? These are some questions that have been perturbing the minds of intellectuals and thinkers from time immemorial. Ancient Indian philosophers conducted specialized studies to find infallible and precise answers to these questions by means of both internal and external enquiry. This enquiry was based not on their own intellect, but on the words of the ancient seers who had intuitional knowledge that was revealed to them by the grace of none other than the Supreme Lord Himself.

These words, which constitute a wide and deep body of divine knowledge, are known as the ‘Vedas’. The Vedas represent such a vast body of literature that it is very difficult to understand its purport in a simple manner.

Therefore the Upanishads emerged, to convey the purport of the Vedas relatively easy and comprehensible. The word “Vedanta” literally means "end (or culmination) of the Vedas". The three most important sources for Vedanta are-

Upanishads (commentaries on the Vedas), the Bramha Sutras and Bhagavad Gita.

The original philosophical text of the Vedanta, the Brahma Sutras of Badarayana, is purportedly a condensation and systematisation of Upanishadic wisdom, so concise and abbreviated that it is considered completely incomprehensible. This ambiguity allowed a huge number of schools and sub schools to develop, each one based on commentaries on the Upanishads, Brahma sutras, Gita, and other authoritative texts.

Different interpretations of the fundamental texts of Vedanta have given rise to three main schools: Advaita (monistic or nondual) of Adi Shankaracharya, Visishtadvaita (qualified non- dualism) of Ramanuja and Dvaita (dualism) of Madhva. There are in addition a variety of other less influential schools like the Vallabha School, Nimbarka school, Bhaskara school and so on, but these are the three most important.

Vedanta generally deals with four topics:

Brahman (the Supreme or Universal soul)

Jivatman (the individual soul)

The Creation of the world

Moksha (liberation), the final goal of human life

But these are explained quite differently according to the metaphysical slant of each particular school.

As mentioned earlier, Vedanta covers a tremendously wide range of metaphysical positions; the three most important being the Non-dual Monism or Advaita Vedanta of Shankara (traditionally 8th-9th century); the Qualified (or modified) Non-Dualism or Vishishtadvaita  Vedanta of Ramanuja (11th-12th century), and the Dualism or Dvaita Vedanta of Mahdva (13th century).

As the titles indicate, only the first is an absolute or true monism, seeing reality as totally unitary, and identifying all things with the Absolute (Brahman). The second teaches a multiplicity or plurality within unity, in that souls and matter are considered "the body" of God (Brahman), but not identical with his essence; and the third teaches that the Supreme God (Bhagavan) is totally separate from souls and from the cosmos.

YOGA

The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali is a foundational text of Yoga. It forms part of the corpus of Sutra literature.

In Indian philosophy, Yoga (also Raja Yoga to distinguish it from later schools) is the name of one of the six orthodox philosophical schools. Though brief, the Yoga Sutras are an enormously influential work on yoga philosophy and practice, held by principal proponents of yoga.

Patañjali fills each sutra with his experiential intelligence, stretching it like a thread (sūtra), and weaving it into a garland of pearls of wisdom to flavor and savor by those who love and live in yoga.

 Philosophical roots and influences

The Sutras are built on a foundation of Sankhya philosophy and also exhibit the influence of Upanishadic, Buddhist and Jain thought. Karel Werner writes that "Patanjali's system is unthinkable without Buddhism. As far as its terminology goes there is much in the Yoga Sutras that reminds us of Buddhist formulations from the Pāli Canon and even more so from the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and from Sautrāntika."

Robert Thurman writes that Patanjali was influenced by the success of the Buddhist monastic system to formulate his own matrix for the version of thought he considered orthodox. The five yamas or the constraints of the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali bear an uncanny resemblance to the five major vows of Jainism, indicating influence of Jainism.  This mutual influence between the Yoga philosophy and Jainism is admitted by the author

Vivian Worthington who writes: "Yoga fully acknowledges its debt to Jainism, and Jainism reciprocates by making the practice of yoga part and parcel of life." 

Christopher Chappel also notes that three teachings closely associated with Jainism appear in Yoga: the doctrine of karma described as colourful in both traditions; the telos of isolation (kevala in Jainism and Kaivalyam in Yoga); and the practice of non-violence (ahimsa). He also notes that the entire list of five yamas (II:30) is identical with the ethical precepts (Mahavratas) taught by Mahavira. 

In the Yoga Sutras, Patanjali prescribes adherence to eight "limbs" or steps (the sum of which constitute "Ashtanga Yoga", the title of the second chapter) to quiet one's mind and achieve kaivalya. The Yoga Sutras form the theoretical and philosophical basis of Raja Yoga, and are considered to be the most organized and complete definition of that discipline. The division into the Eight Limbs (Sanskrit Ashtanga) of Yoga is reminiscent of Buddha's Noble Eightfold Path; inclusion of Brahmaviharas (Yoga Sutra 1:33) also shows Buddhism's influence on parts of the Sutras.

The Sutras not only provide yoga with a thorough and consistent philosophical basis, they also clarify many important esoteric concepts which are common to all traditions of Indian thought, such as karma.

Usage

Although Patanjali's work does not cover the many types of Yogic practices that have become prevalent, its succinct form and availability caused it to be pressed into service by a variety of schools of Yogic thought.

The Sutras, with commentaries, have been published by a number of successful teachers of Yoga, as well as by academicians seeking to clarify issues of textual variation. There are also other versions from a variety of sources available on the Internet. The many versions display a wide variation, particularly in translation. The text has not been submitted in its entirety to any rigorous textual analysis, and the contextual meaning of many of the Sanskrit words and phrases remains a matter of some dispute.

Text

Patanjali divided his Yoga Sutras into 4 chapters or books (Sanskrit pada), containing in all 196 aphorisms, divided as follows:

* Samadhi Pada (51 sutras)

Samadhi refers to a blissful state where the yogi is absorbed into the One. The author describes yoga and then the nature and the means to attaining samādhi. This chapter contains the famous definitional verse: "Yogaś citta-vritti-nirodhaḥ" ("Yoga is the restraint of mental modifications").

* Sadhana Pada (55 sutras)

Sadhana is the Sanskrit word for "practice" or "discipline". Here the author outlines two forms of Yoga: Kriya Yoga (Action Yoga) and Ashtanga Yoga (Eightfold or Eightlimbed Yoga).

Kriya yoga, sometimes called Karma Yoga, is also expounded in Chapter 3 of the Bhagavad Gita, where Arjuna is encouraged by Krishna to act without attachment to the results or fruit of action and activity. It is the yoga of selfless action and service.

Ashtanga Yoga describes the eight limbs that together constitute Raja Yoga.

* Vibhuti Pada (56 sutras)

Vibhuti is the Sanskrit word for "power" or "manifestation". 'Supra-normal powers' (Sanskrit: siddhi) are acquired by the practice of yoga. The temptation of these powers should be avoided and the attention should be fixed only on liberation.

* Kaivalya Pada (34 sutras)

Kaivalya literally means "isolation", but as used in the Sutras stands for emancipation, liberation and used interchangeably with moksha (liberation), which is the goal of Yoga. The Kaivalya Pada describes the nature of liberation and the reality of the transcendental self.

The eight limbs (ashtanga) of Raja Yoga

The eight "limbs" or steps prescribed in the second pada of the Yoga Sutras are: Yama, Niyama, Asana, Pranayama, Pratyahara, Dharana, Dhyana and Samadhi.

Ashtanga yoga consists of the following steps: The first five are called external aids to Yoga (bahiranga sadhana)

* Yama: refers to the five abstentions. These are the same as the five vows of Jainism.

* Ahimsa: non-violence, inflicting no injury or harm to others or even to one's ownself, it goes as far as nonviolence in thought, word and deed.

* Satya: truth in word & thought.

* Asteya: non-covetousness, to the extent that one should not even desire something that is not his own.

* Brahmacharya: abstain from sexual intercourse; celibacy in case of unmarried people and monogamy in case of married people. Even this to the extent that one should not possess any sexual thoughts towards any other man or woman except one's own spouse. It's common to associate Brahmacharya with celibacy.

* Aparigraha: non-possessiveness

* Niyama refers to the five observances

* Shaucha: cleanliness of body & mind.

* Santosha: satisfaction; satisfied with what one has.

* Tapas: austerity and associated observances for body discipline & thereby mental control.

* Svadhyaya: study of the Vedic scriptures to know about God and the soul, which leads to introspection on a greater awakening to the soul and God within,

* Ishvarapranidhana: surrender to (or worship of) God.

* Asana: Discipline of the body: rules and postures to keep it disease-free and for preserving vital energy. Correct postures are a physical aid to meditation, for they control the limbs and nervous system and prevent them from producing disturbances.

* Pranayama: control of breath. Beneficial to health, steadies the body and is highly conducive to the concentration of the mind.

* Pratyahara: withdrawal of senses from their external objects.

The last three levels are called internal aids to Yoga (antaranga sadhana)

* Dharana: concentration of the citta upon a physical object, such as a flame of a lamp, the mid point of the eyebrows, or the image of a deity.

* Dhyana: steadfast meditation. Undisturbed flow of thought around the object of meditation (pratyayaikatanata). The act of meditation and the object of meditation remain distinct and separate.
* Samadhi: oneness with the object of meditation. There is no distinction between act of meditation and the object of meditation. Samadhi is of two kinds:

o Samprajnata Samadhi conscious samadhi. The mind remains concentrated (ekagra) on the object of meditation, therefore the consciousness of the object of meditation persists. Mental modifications arise only in respect of this object of meditation.

This state is of four kinds:

+ Savitarka: the Citta is concentrated upon a gross object of meditation such as a flame of a lamp, the tip of the nose, or the image of a deity.
+ Savichara: the Citta is concentrated upon a subtle object of meditation , such as the tanmatras
+ Sananda: the Citta is concentrated upon a still subtler object of meditation, like the senses.

+ Sasmita: the Citta is concentrated upon the ego-substance with which the self is generally identified.

o Asamprajnata Samadhi supraconscious. The citta and the object of meditation are fused together. The consciousness of the object of meditation is transcended. All mental modifications are checked (niruddha), although latent impressions may continue.

Combined simultaneous practice of Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna & Samādhi is referred to as Samyama and is considered a tool of achieving various perfections, or Siddhis.